Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is a part of 5th generation (5G) communication systems.
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The set of channels preferred by v among the channels that the base station is willing to allocate to v domain multiplexing NOMA, different codes are assigned to different users to enable multiuser communications. In this aspect, code domain NOMA is similar to code division multiple access (CDMA) [5] .
This article presents a stable user-channel allocation scheme for NOMA LTE cellular V2X
systems. The main contributions of this article is presenting a user-channel allocation NOMA scheme that always converges to a solution. In addition, the scheme always leads to a stable and optimal solution in which no channel could be allocated to a better user and no user could be assigned to transmit over a better channel if they deviate from this scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents results on the novel userchannel allocation scheme in NOMA cellular V2X communications. Section III concludes the paper. Table I contains abbreviations and the notation used throughout the paper.
II. System Model
In our scheme, NOMA allows each channel to be allocated to more than one vehicle and each vehicle can use more than one channel. This article has further aimed to study the underlying structures of the problem of user-channel allocation in NOMA.
We denote the set of users (here, vehicles) by V and the set of channels by C . We denote the power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of V and C by P(V ) and P(C ), respectively. Using NOMA, the base station allocates every channel to a subset of vehicles, i.e., an element of P(V ). In addition, every vehicle is allocated to a subset of channels, taken from P(C ). The base station has geolocation information of the users. The allocation can be based on various criteria, such as geolocation data, maximum data rate, minimum error rate, etc. To this end, we note that every vehicle v ∈ V has a preference P(v) over P(C ), which means preferring a subset of channels over another subset of channels. Similarly, every channel c ∈ C has a preference P(c) that prefers a subset of vehicles to another subset of vehicles, e.g., according to the ergodic capacity, geolocation, etc. For any vehicle v ∈ V , the set of allocations is a subset of C , and for any channel c ∈ C , the set of allocations is a subset of V .
We denote the NOMA user-channel allocation by the matching M. We note that a NOMA user-channel allocation is called individually rational if neither the base station nor the user prefer to cancel some of the channel allocations [6] . In some cases, if the NOMA user-channel allocation is not effective, more than just one userchannel pair are involved in the blocking. This leads us to consider setwise blocking, wherein a set of channels and users would like to implement a new set of allocations among themselves while possibly cancelling other allocations. Setwise blockings also require that the blocking allocation is individually rational, i.e., none of the members of the blocking coalition has an incentive to cancel the allocations unilaterally [6] . In fact, this is the main incentive for the formation of the blocking coalition among a subset of users and a subset of channels.
After defining the individual rationality and blockings for user-channel allocations, we are now ready to define a stable NOMA user-channel allocation, which is a robust and efficient allocation. A stable NOMA user-channel allocation is individually rational (as defined above) and does not involve any blocking. It is important for the NOMA resource allocation algorithm to be stable. In addition, being individually rational is a necessary condition for the stability of NOMA resource allocation.
The NOMA user-channel assignment consists of allocating more than one user to a channel while any user can transmit over several channels, as long as the user's transceiver has the hardware/software radio capabilities for transmission over multiple channels. Therefore, this problem can be cast to many-to-many matching. It is shown that in many-to-many matching, the core is not the same as the set of (setwise) stable matchings, unlike one-to-one matching.
This is a consequence of the fact that in the core allocation, the users have an incentive to unilaterally cancel their allocations [6] . Therefore, the core is not a solution to NOMA userchannel resource allocation. Accordingly, to derive a stable NOMA resource allocation, we need to eliminate blockings as defined before. More specifically, we need to find matchings that are both pairwise-stable and setwise-stable, i.e., that have neither pairwise blocks nor setwise blocks.
In this regard, we consider the concept of substitutability and then relate it to finding the solution of stable NOMA resource allocation.
In simple words, the notion of substitutability implies that if the base station (on behalf of a particular channel) does not choose a vehicle from some set of vehicles, then that vehicle is still not chosen by the base station from a larger set of vehicles. Similarly, if the preference P(v) of a vehicle v ∈ V does not choose a channel from some set of channels, then that channel will not be chosen from a larger set of channels [7] .
In other words, the preference P(v) of a vehicle v ∈ V (or P(c) of a channel c ∈ C ) is called substitutable if it meets the following condition: when a vehicle v (or channel c) selects a channel (vehicle) among some set of channels (vehicles), then the same channel (vehicle) will be chosen by v (or c) from a smaller set of channels (vehicles).
In strong substitutable preference conditions [8] if a vehicle v prefers a channel c among some set of channels, then that vehicle selects the same channel c from a worse set of channels that includes it. In other terms, if the vehicle v does not select a particular channel from some set of channels, then, that channel will not be selected by v from a set of better channels for v, according to the preference profile P(v).
Strong substitutability is a sufficient condition for substitutability. The reason we are interested in strong substitutability is due to its relation to stability of NOMA resource allocations. If preferences are strongly substitutable, then the set of pairwise stable allocations is equal to the set of setwise stable resource allocations [8] .
A. Differences with OFDMA
In OFDMA, only one user is allocated to every channel, whereas in NOMA multiple users are allocated to one channel. In addition, each user can transmit over two or more channels, as long as the user has the necessary configurations. Therefore, in OFDMA, core matching is a solution for channel allocation, since it is individually rational and pairwise stable. However, unlike OFDMA, in NOMA wherein multiple users transmit over a channel and multiple channels are allocated to a user (many-to-many matching), core matching is not a solution, since it may not be individually rational. In other words, the core channel allocation may provide a solution in which a user v 1 ∈ V may get better quality of service (QoS) over another channel c i ∈ C compared to its current assigned channel c j ∈ C (by core matching) and at the same time the allocation of c i to another user v 2 ∈ V would give better performance than allocating it to user v 1 . This violation of pairwise stability shows us that unlike OFDMA, in NOMA, core matching is not a stable solution to the channel allocation problem.
The solutions for the NOMA channel allocation problem can be divided into the following categories:
1) setwise stable channel/user allocations, i.e., individually rational channel/user allocation that cannot be blocked by a coalition [9] , [10] ;
2) individually rational core: the set of individually rational matchings that cannot be blocked [10] ;
3) a user-channel allocation that meets pairwise stability property, i.e., without any pairwise blocking; and 4) the set of fix-points of a function [8] : In the matching that is described in this article, each user v (or the base station on behalf of a channel c) is selecting the most preferred channels (or users), among the set of potential channels (or users) that also prefer to be matched to v (or c).
B. NOMA User-Channel Allocation as a Bargaining Game
Another interpretation of NOMA user-channel resource allocation is a non-cooperative bargaining game [8] . The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is used for sequential games. It implies that not only the outcomes of the game need to be in a Nash equilibrium, but in every subgame the strategy profile needs to be in a Nash equilibrium [11] . A subgame is the piece of a game that is played starting at any point at which the complete history of the game played so far is common knowledge [12] .
The main reason behind this model as shown in Fig. 1 is that the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes of the game has the setwise stability property considering a complete-information setting. As mentioned before, stability is an important factor for NOMA resource allocation. 
C. Stable NOMA User-Channel Allocation
The details of the stable NOMA user-channel allocation scheme are outlined in Algorithm 1.
To clarify Algorithm 1, we consider the following example. Step 1:
Step 2: Find U(c, M) ⊲ The set of vehicles that are willing to transmit on channel c, possibly after dropping some of the channels, assigned by M(v).
4:
Find V(v, M) ⊲ The set of channels that the base station is willing to allocate to v, possibly after dropping some of the vehicles, assigned by M(c).
5:
Step 3: Find T M(c) ⊲ channel c's optimal set of vehicles among those willing to transmit on c.
6:
Find T M(v) ⊲ The set of channels preferred by v, among channels that the base station is willing to allocate to v. Step 1: First, we initialize the algorithm by allocating all the channels to every vehicle and allocating no car to any channel.
7: Update M(c) ← T M(c) and M(v) ← T M(v)
Step 2: For every vehicle v and every channel c, using their given preferences and the matching M, the sets U(c, M) and V(v, M) happen to be as follows:
Step 3: For every vehicle v and every channel c, using the matching M, find the sets T M(v) and T M(c) and update the current matching M(.) using the value of T M(.), i.e.,
In 
Next, we move to Step 3 to update the values of NOMA resource allocation M(c) and M(v)
for every channel c and every vehicle v, as in Eq. 4
In the third iteration, we restart from Step 2 of Algorithm 1 as in Eq. 5.
The matching M(.) is updated according to Step 3 of Algorithm 1 as follows:
In the fourth iteration, the same results are obtained as in the third iteration. It shows that the algorithm has converged to a stable solution.
D. Stability Analysis and Convergence of Algorithm 1
The gist of NOMA resource allocation in Algorithm 1 is finding the fix-points of a function T M(.) using the matching M [13] . The fix-points of a function are values in the domain of the function that are mapped to the same equal value (i.e., to themselves) in the range. Algorithm 1 finds the fix-points by iteration. As soon as two iterations are the same, the fix-point has been found, and the result is a stable matching.
Even for non-substitutable preferences of users and channels, the matching returned by Algorithm 1 is always pairwise stable [8] . In other words, this NOMA resource allocation is robust even if neither the vehicles' preferences p(v), ∀v ∈ V nor the channels' preferences p(c), ∀c ∈ C meet the substitutability property.
In addition, if only the preferences of the vehicles p(v), ∀v ∈ V are substitutable, while the preferences of the channels p(c), ∀c ∈ C are not substitutable, the NOMA resource allocation returned by Algorithm 1 is stable and coincides with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game described in Section III. B and Fig.1 . By symmetry, the same result holds [8] if only the preferences of the channels p(c), ∀c ∈ C are substitutable, while the preferences of the vehicles p(v), ∀v ∈ V do not satisfy the substitutability property.
Asymptotically, in the limits, if one side, i.e., p(c), ∀c ∈ C is substitutable and the other side, e.g., p(v), ∀v ∈ V is strongly substitutable, the resource allocation returned by Algorithm 1 is always guaranteed to be setwise stable. For example, this might happen in practice when a quota is imposed on the maximum number of NOMA users per channel to restrict the complexity of the SIC decoder at the receiver. In this case, strong substitutability may be challenging to implement or not feasible for p(c), ∀c ∈ C . However, with the advent of advanced NOMA decoders that can handle massive number of users per channel, a setwise stable NOMA resource allocation is always guaranteed to exist.
To ease the above-mentioned condition on strong substitutability, if we let both sides, i.e., p(c), ∀c ∈ C and p(v), ∀v ∈ V be only substitutable, the NOMA user-channel allocation scheme described in Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to an answer, which is pairwise stable [8] .
III. Conclusion
This paper has aimed to investigate the problem of NOMA resource allocation for a set of users and a set of channels. Every channel can be allocated to more than one user by utilizing superposition coding. Each user can operate on multiple channels simultaneously as long as this is allowed by the hardware/software radio transceiver configurations of the user.
The proposed resource allocation was studied for cellular V2X. The base station holds the vehicles' geolocation information. The conditions for the stability of resource allocation were further discussed in this paper. Additionally, a stable NOMA user-channel allocation algorithm was used that is individually rational. Unlike OFDMA, the stable NOMA user-channel allocation algorithm circumvents nonoptimality of core allocations.
